Earlier today on this blog, Tom Lord offered what I found to be an especially illuminating comment on my post about Beau Friedlander’s article on the differences between the book and the web as conduits of information and ideas. For those who didn’t see Tom’s comment, I reprint it here in full. The first sentence refers to an earlier comment that had cited Jacob Bronowski’s “assert[ion] that Man is the only animal with ‘social evolution’ through language and stored memories in books.”
Language does a lot more than just “store knowledge.”
Language also has a very rich syntax compared to anything other animals have. Comparatively abstract and complicated messages (notice I did not say “ideas” or “knowledge”) can be conveyed.
Homo sapiens can thus (and do) exhibit more complex kinds of social behavior.
That capacity gave rise to “oral traditions”: ways to preserve (with drift) certain linguistic expressions over time, space, and individuals. Full blown writing systems extended that. Then presses. Of late, things like the Internet.
But, notice that I’m very careful to not talk about preserving “ideas” or “knowledge” because that’s only a part of what language does and there’s not even any a priori reason to think it’s a permanent part of what language does.
Language can also convey pure ritual, for example. By ritual, I mean “language games” that a person or group of people can “act out” – translate from just the remembered song or the big tome into some social practice in the real world, people really “acting out” the ritual with no understanding – no meaning beyond “here, we do the ritual.”
Now, consider a particular piece of writing. Could be a procedures manual for running a nuke plant or it could be a teacher’s manual for teaching “Huckleberry Finn” complete with instructions for testing the student’s “literary appreciation” with some multiple-choice and short-essay questions, could be a grocery list, or could be “War and Peace.”
Are those writings the sort that convey ideas and knowledge? Or the sort that convey pure ritual?
Each is both.
It happens in the real human world, all the time, that writing slips back and forth between conveying ideas / knowledge and conveying pure ritual. A school starts teaching Huck Finn by rote and winds up teaching only the ritual of passing the cliched quizzes, for example: knowledge lost, ritual dominant. Maybe new teaching staff notices and reminds everyone of the original intent of the quizzes – of the ideas behind them – leading to a change in practices. Knowledge “recovered” from ritual at the last moment.
It isn’t hard to imagine a society in which, at least for the bulk of the people, all writing becomes pure ritual with the only knowledge commonly held being the practice of ritual itself.
Such a society would first become a kind of “cargo-cult” parody of itself, seeming at first to continue operating more or less normally. For example, the nuke plant staff may steadily lose any sense of knowledge behind their procedures and yet, if the plant was well built and the procedures well designed, initially the rituals keep the plant running whether the people understand how or not.
A “cargo-cult” phase would give way, eventually, to a degenerate phase in which “things fall apart” but the knowledge of how they were supposed to work – the knowledge needed to design repairs – is gone. Oops. The nuke plant mysteriously exploded. Now what?
What of the case of Eliot’s antisemitism quoted in Nick’s piece? What is it, exactly? Is it neatly captured and “taught” by a few sentences in Wikipedia? Or by sampling a few sentences from various on-line theses? Something you can figure out almost instantaneously using Google?
If you think so, I say that that’s a slip from knowledge to ritual. Pavlov’s dog could understand as well: someone says “Eliot,” the good dog does a quick search and says “antisemite!”
Whatever was Eliot’s case it was a real, singular case in a real, specific historical context. Eliot’s case is, if nothing else, rich with detail. We don’t learn about Eliot’s case by hearing it ritualistically dubbed “antisemitic.” We learn about antisemitism in a particular historical period by, for example, examining Eliot’s case.
In the economics of scholarship – good scholarship – we tend to not forget that just saying “antisemitic” doesn’t in and of itself tell us much about Eliot. We tend to remember and remember how to explore that we learn about antisemitism in part by studying the details of Eliot’s case. The Google approach to “learning anything quickly” doesn’t convey scholarship – just quick and dirty call-and-response labels.
In the idealized and perfected economics of Google, people mostly sit around consuming and producing content through the enactment of rituals as encoded in the logic of web pages, indirectly controlling the flow of money and goods. Producers observe the people and compete for their purchases by giving them fractions of the purchase price through advertising. People buy on-line, extract some use-value, and resell on-line. The system is not much interested in preserving and conveying scholarship for scholarship cannot be conveyed “almost instantly” in a few well-selected search results.
The Enlightenment gets “defined” lots of different ways and I’m not much of one for definitive definitions but here’s one way to define it:
The Enlightenment is the convergence of a set of important ideas: the idea of individual freedom; the idea of rationality and of the limits and problems of rationality; the sense that an aware-of-the-problematics employment of rationality is not only compatible with but necessary to individual freedom; the sense that the social and economic order is what reproduces the Enlightenment across time and space and what can fail to reproduce it. (Thus, for example, it leads directly to the American Revolution.)
As we more and more intrusively let the Net redefine “friendship,” “reputation,” “freedom,” “collaboration,” and “knowledge,” we are turning our attention away from the real social order and we’re turning our backs on the Enlightenment entirely. We’re giving up all of that to play a video game, with Google, complete with Real Prizes. We’re picking ritual over ideas and knowledge.
-t